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Improving Coherence between Development Policy and Other Policies 
The Case of Germany 
The success of development policy partly depends on the effects of other policies which – intentionally or unintentionally – may 
support, but also impair, development cooperation efforts. Development policy must therefore bear other policies in mind in 
order to prevent incoherence and generate synergies as far as possible. There are numerous examples of incoherence. Foreign 
policy, export and labor market interests have repeatedly eclipsed development policy objectives. The EU’s trade, agricultural 
and fisheries policies have counteracted development cooperation projects and programs in several cases. There is a tense 
relationship between development and arms export policies. 
Besides these cases of incoherence about which advocates of development cooperation have complained, four factors have giv-
en added weight to the subject of policy coherence: (i) the inclusion of the requirement of coherence with development policy in 
the Maastricht/Amsterdam Treaty, (ii) increased pressure to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of development coopera-
tion in view of declining budget allocations, (iii) the extended right enjoyed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) since mid-2000 to examine legislation planned by other government departments for its impact on 
development and (iv) the Program of Action 2015 adopted by the Federal Government in 2001, which calls for a coherent ap-
proach by various policies in order to achieve the internationally agreed goal of halving extreme poverty by 2015. 
The issue of policy coherence has played a growing role in the development policy debate in Germany in recent years. There 
have been campaigns and a number of proposals for greater coherence. Since 1998, most of the steps taken (in addition to the 
Program of Action 2015) to improve coherence have been institutional, and they should be fully exploited. Whether the BMZ 
requires further areas of responsibility to achieve greater coherence should be considered as and when necessary. 
In general, however, it is true to say that development policy is not just a matter for the BMZ, but a task for many policies. The 
BMZ should not therefore take on the tasks of other policies and so overexert itself, but increasingly urge and help other gov-
ernment departments to share responsibility for development policy. To this end, three steps seem important: (i) improvement 
of the BMZ’s analytical competence for closer observation of the impact on development of other policies, (ii) intensive coher-
ence-related dialogue with other government departments and (iii) mobilization of political support for greater coherence. 
Development policy and effects of other policies 
The goal of development policy, according to the German 
Government’s 11th Report on Development Policy published 
in May 2001, is to help create decent living conditions in 
partner countries in South and East and to safeguard our 
common future. It does not, however, act alone in this re-
spect: although they pursue their own objectives, other poli-
cies, too, influence development in partner countries and at 
global level. They may support development cooperation ef-
forts, or they may impair or even nullify them. 
Where they support development policy, there is coherence 
from the development cooperation perspective; where they 
do not, there is incoherence. If, then, the success of develop-
ment efforts also depends on the effects of other policies, 
development policy cannot be confined to promoting devel-
opment cooperation projects and programs, but must bear 
other policies in mind and influence them with a view to 
preventing incoherence and generating synergies. 
Examples of policy incoherence 
Other policies may impair development policy efforts in two 
ways. On the one hand, the objectives of development policy 
may be eclipsed by other policy interests, resulting in inco-
herence between the declared objectives and the practice of 
development cooperation. The special feature here is the di-
rect influence that other policies have on development coop-
eration. For example, it has been eclipsed by: 
• Foreign policy interests: In the 1960s, countries that 
recognized the then German Democratic Republic were 
excluded from development cooperation (Hallstein Doc-
trine). In the 1990s, the application of the BMZ’s political 
criteria for the commitment of development cooperation 
(respect for human rights, etc.) varied because of overrid-
ing foreign policy interests (as in the case of China). 
• Export and labor market interests: A portion (even larger 
in the past) of German development cooperation dis-
bursements is tied to supplies from Germany (possibly 
making development cooperation projects more expen-
sive). Assistance has been provided for projects which are 
controversial in development policy terms (e.g. the 
Shanghai underground railway). 
On the other hand, development cooperation is undertaken in 
accordance with its declared objectives, while other policies 
either directly impair development cooperation efforts or run 
counter to their intentions. Examples: 
• Trade policy: The German Government and the EU ad-
vocate the developing countries’ integration into the 
world economy and promote the development of the pri-
vate sector and exports of many partner countries. At the 
same time, the EU’s foreign trade policy still has numer-
ous protectionist elements, especially in the agricultural 
sector. An open trade policy, on the other hand, comple-
ments development cooperation efforts and generates 
synergies. 
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• Agricultural policy: To improve food security in West 
Africa, German development cooperation has promoted 
beef production in a number of the region’s countries. 
The success of these projects has, however, been threat-
ened by subsidized EU beef exports to the partner coun-
tries (adverse effects on local production efforts). Subsi-
dized EU milk powder exports are harming the milk sec-
tor in India, which is being assisted with EU aid. 
• Fisheries policy: German development cooperation as-
sists artisanal coastal fishery projects, an essential source 
of protein for the poor in many countries. The EU has 
concluded fishery agreements with some 20 developing 
countries (primarily on the coast of West Africa) that 
grant the EU fleets fishing rights in the partner countries’ 
200-mile zone in return for compensatory payments and 
development aid. Excessively high quotas, inadequate su-
pervision and breaches of the agreements have since led 
to overfishing on numerous occasions, threatening an im-
portant source of food and incomes for these countries. 
• Fiscal policy (corruption): In the context of development 
cooperation, the German Government demands and pro-
motes good governance in the partner countries, and yet 
for a long time it was possible to deduct bribes paid to 
foreign government officials from tax payable in Ger-
many. It was not until 1999 that pressure from the OECD 
led to the removal of this possibility. 
• Arms export policy: In view of the many violent conflicts 
in and between developing countries, which not only 
cause human suffering but also destroy the development 
efforts of many years, development cooperation sees con-
flict prevention as an important task. On the other hand, 
despite strict arms export legislation, which has repeat-
edly led to the rejection of applications to export arma-
ments and accounts for Germany’s small share of interna-
tional arms exports to developing countries, the German 
Government has in recent years approved the supply of 
arms and military equipment to developing countries 
where the internal situation features conflict or regional 
security is under threat (e.g. Egypt, India, Indonesia, Is-
rael and Turkey). 
Topicality of the call for greater policy coherence 
Policy coherence has become a more pressing issue in recent 
years for several reasons: 
• The Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) 
first enshrined in law the requirement of coherence be-
tween development policy and other policies: “The Com-
munity shall take account of the objectives [of its devel-
opment policy] in the policies that it implements which 
are likely to affect the developing countries” (Article 178 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam). Even though, formally, this 
article applies only to the Community and not to the 
Member States (which are, however, required by Article 
10 to act in the Community’s best interests) and is 
worded in rather guarded terms, it represents an important 
point of reference. 
• The decline in German development cooperation efforts 
since the early 1990s (from DM 11.4 billion, or 0.39 % of 
GNP, in 1991 to DM 10.7 billion, or 0.27 % of GNP, in 
2000) has increased the pressure to improve the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of development cooperation and, 
to this end, to ensure greater policy coherence. 
• In July 2000, as part of the Joint Standing Orders (GGO) 
of the federal ministries, the BMZ was granted an ex-
tended right to examine legislation planned by other min-
istries for its impact on development. While under the old 
GGO the BMZ did not receive other departments’ pro-
posals for legislation until late in the process, it is now 
involved at an early stage and itself considers whether 
development policy interests are affected. 
• At the United Nations’ Millennium Summit in September 
2000, 150 heads of state or government reaffirmed the 
goal of halving the proportion of people living in extreme 
poverty (people with less than US $ 1 a day; 1990: 1.3 
billion or 29 %) by 2015. With a view to this objective, 
the German Government adopted in April 2001 its Pro-
gram of Action 2015, which not only sees poverty reduc-
tion as a task for development cooperation but also calls 
for a coherent approach by the environment, agricultural, 
trade, economic, finance, science and technology policies. 
What goals determine coherence? 
The call for greater policy coherence has long been taken to 
mean the prevention of incoherence and, in the light of ex-
perience, rightly so. A lack of coherence may lead to ineffec-
tiveness (failure to achieve objectives), inefficiency (waste of 
scarce resources) and loss of policy credibility. Policy coher-
ence is therefore desirable for good governance. 
However, this says nothing about the angle from which co-
herence should be seen. What right does development policy 
have to demand that other policies take greater account of 
development? If it is argued that coherence is not a one-way 
street, development policy might also be expected, con-
versely, to take account of other policy objectives by contrib-
uting, say, to the promotion of German exports and jobs. 
Development policy is, after all, subject to cabinet discipline 
and, like all other policies, to the constitutional requirement 
that it serve German interests (oath of office taken by every 
minister). In calling for greater coherence, then, is develop-
ment policy falling into a trap? 
This is not the case if there are overriding objectives to serve 
as a guideline for determining the contributions to be made 
by various policies to coherence. In the past ten years, there 
has been welcome progress in this respect. 
• The world conferences of the 1990s, such as the 1992 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro, the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna and the 1995 World Summit on Social Develop-
ment in Copenhagen, did a great deal to universalize 
various pivotal values (e.g. sustainable development and 
respect for human rights) for shaping global development 
that all policies must take into account. Halving extreme 
poverty by 2015 is a prescription for development policy 
and other policies. The OECD countries have repeatedly 
committed themselves to ensuring greater coherence in 
their policies towards developing countries to cope with 
the challenges of global development. 
• Globalization and the question how our society can cope 
with the future have led to an intensive debate on the 
shared responsibility of our policies for global develop-
ment. Mention need be made only of the German Parlia-
ment’s Select Committee on the Globalization of the 
World Economy. The BMZ sees development policy as 
helping to safeguard our common future, which is very 
much in Germany’s interests. 
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The call for greater policy coherence seen from the angle of 
development policy is thus justified. This does not mean, of 
course, that development policy should or can become the 
sole yardstick for all policies, but that other policies must 
take greater account of partner countries’ development pros-
pects and of global development objectives. This is a major 
challenge both politically and practically. 
Causes of policy incoherence and plea for an appropriate 
understanding of coherence 
The main causes of policy incoherence are: 
• Divergent political interests: Policy incoherence is often 
the result of divergent political interests. At the same 
time, development policy tends to be weak in the play of 
forces with other policies since it has no powerful domes-
tic policy interest groups behind it. Greater policy coher-
ence seen from the angle of development policy therefore 
requires special efforts to mobilize public support. 
• Different areas of responsibility at national and EU level: 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that some 
policies, such as the foreign trade, agricultural and fisher-
ies policies, are the EU’s responsibility, i.e. they cannot 
be adjusted by an individual EU Member State even 
though it may be well aware of incoherence of some kind. 
The call for greater coherence therefore means that the 
governments of the EU Member States must bear in mind 
not only their own policies but also EU policies for which 
they share responsibility. 
• Partner countries’ failure to take countermeasures: It is 
often assumed that partner countries are merely the vic-
tims of the donor countries’ incoherent policies. But in 
some cases they can certainly defend themselves, for ex-
ample, by protecting their agriculture against subsidized 
EU farm exports with countervailing duties. This is obvi-
ously a question of differing interests within partner 
countries (the urban population’s interest in cheap food 
on the one hand, the rural population’s development 
prospects on the other). Advocates of development coop-
eration and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
the donor countries should therefore raise the issue of 
policy coherence not only at home and at EU level but 
also in the dialogue with partner countries. 
• Deficiencies in the organization of decision-making on 
policy: Pursuing as coherent an overall policy as possible 
is in principle a task for interdepartmental coordination, 
with heads of government taking ultimate responsibility. 
The distribution of powers, the opportunities the various 
departments have to participate in decision-making and 
the weight carried by development policy in this context 
may make policy coherence easier or more difficult. 
• Information deficits: Incoherence like that referred to 
above may be self-evident. In many cases, however, the 
effects of other policies on the development process in 
partner countries and at global level and the interaction 
among these policies are less obvious and can be identi-
fied only with considerable effort. Impact analyses, in-
formation procurement and the systematic use of avail-
able, but often scattered, information are therefore vital. 
• Complexity of the development process: Regardless of the 
information deficits, the main problem continues to be the 
complexity of socioeconomic and political development, 
which frequently allows the links between cause and ef-
fect to be only partly recognized, especially in the case of 
forecasts. Halving extreme poverty by 2015 may be a 
clear and internationally accepted goal, and considerable 
experience of reducing poverty may have been gained, 
but this does not mean that there is general agreement as 
regards the necessary strategies. There is no objective 
yardstick for policy coherence. 
The general conclusion is that complete policy coherence is 
possible neither in theory nor in practice. A realistic and 
politically appropriate objective should therefore be, on the 
one hand, to overcome obvious incoherence and, on the other 
hand, progressively to improve coherence through: 
• a more accurate understanding of the interaction among 
different policies that influence development in partner 
countries and globally, 
• the greater involvement of aspects of coherence in the 
formulation of other policies, 
• the mobilization of political support for greater coherence 
in order to achieve such overriding objectives as halving 
poverty by 2015 or global environmental objectives. 
This is necessarily a process of trial and error. 
Campaigns and proposals for greater policy coherence 
Policy coherence has played a growing role in the develop-
ment policy debate in Germany since the early 1990s. This 
has occurred against the background of the cases of incoher-
ence referred to above, which have been criticized not only 
by development cooperation institutions but also by NGOs 
and the development policy committees of the Christian-
Democratic Union (CDU), the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) and the Greens, especially before the last two federal 
parliamentary elections, and seen as a reason for proposing 
various improvements in coherence (see box). In this process, 
it has become clear that: 
Earlier proposals for greater policy coherence 
• Strengthening development policy through a separate 
law, as in several other donor countries 
• Creating a development cabinet chaired by the Chan-
cellor and involving the relevant government depart-
ments to ensure greater coherence among the various 
policies to the benefit of development 
• Strengthening the BMZ’s coordinating and monitoring 
role within the Federal Government (e.g. by means of 
guidelines on sustainable development to be used by 
the BMZ to monitor other policies) 
• Increasing the BMZ’s areas of responsibility: 
– Variant I: Transferring to the BMZ other depart-
ments’ responsibilities relating to development 
cooperation (e.g. humanitarian aid, currently a 
Foreign Office responsibility) 
– Variant II: Upgrading the BMZ to a “Ministry 
for International Cooperation and Sustainable 
Development”, embracing pivotal aspects of in-
ternational structural policy (e.g. debt and raw 
materials policies, Rio follow-up process and in-
ternational agricultural and technology policies) 
• Integrating the BMZ into the Foreign Office to give 
development cooperation more weight in foreign policy 
and better representation in partner countries 
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• Development policy initiatives, NGOs and Churches have 
made a wider public aware of the incoherence in the case 
of the EU’s subsidized beef exports and fisheries agree-
ments, fiscal policy (corruption) and arms exports by 
holding hearings and conducting information campaigns 
(some at European level) and so exerted political pres-
sure, which has helped to ensure that adjustments have 
been made (e.g. reduction of beef export subsidies in the 
mid-1990s). 
• The proposals for greater coherence referred to in the box 
all primarily address the organization of decision-making 
on policy (areas of responsibility). Important though this 
aspect is, it must not be given absolute primacy over the 
other causes, as this may arouse unjustified expectations. 
What is ultimately decisive (besides solutions to the prob-
lems of analysis and information) is the political will for 
greater coherence that results from the play of political 
forces. 
Changes in recent years 
Since 1998, a number of mostly institutional steps (in addi-
tion to the amendment of the GGO and the adoption of the 
Program of Action 2015) have been taken to achieve greater 
coherence: 
• transfer to the BMZ of further responsibilities relevant to 
development cooperation (e.g. EU development coopera-
tion and the TRANSFORM Program), 
• inclusion of the BMZ in the Federal Security Council, 
which is responsible, among other things, for principles 
and decisions relating to the arms export policy, 
• development policy interests taken into account in the 
amended Political Principles for Arms Exports and the 
Guidelines for Granting Export Guarantees (“Hermes 
Guarantees”), 
• creation of the Task Force 2015 within the BMZ, which, 
among others, is responsible for coordinating and moni-
toring the implementation of the 75 actions to be taken by 
the various government departments, and appointment of 
contact persons for the Program of Action in each de-
partment. 
Recommendations for German development policy 
Against this background, the first step should be to exploit to 
the full the BMZ’s extended opportunities for taking action. 
Whether the BMZ requires further areas of responsibility to 
improve coherence should be considered as and when neces-
sary. In general, however, it is true to say that development 
policy is not just a matter for the BMZ, but a cross-sectoral 
task for many policies. The BMZ should not therefore take 
on the tasks of other policies and so overexert itself, but urge 
and help other government departments to share responsibil-
ity for development policy. To this end, the following steps 
are important: 
• Improving analytical capacity and the information base: 
Various cases of incoherence are well-known. The goal 
of coherence, however, is not confined to eliminating this 
incoherence, but is more comprehensive: it also includes 
examination of other departments’ plans for legislation, 
implementation of the Program of Action 2015 and ef-
forts to achieve sustainable development. For this, closer 
observation of the effects of other policies will be needed 
to identify incoherence and potential synergies. This is 
not only for the BMZ to achieve, but it is certainly one of 
its essential tasks. If it is to exercise its right under the 
GGO to ensure coherence with development policy and to 
make other departments aware of the need for greater co-
herence, the BMZ needs to increase its analytical compe-
tence, which it can achieve by delegating project-related 
tasks and by mobilizing external expertise. 
• Intensive coherence-related dialogue between the BMZ 
and other government departments: The BMZ should 
identify the areas of policy where there is relevant inco-
herence and the best prospects of practical and policy 
change so that it may then focus on achieving greater co-
herence with the appropriate departments at national and 
EU level. To encourage other policies to make positive 
contributions to the Federal Government’s Program of 
Action 2015, for example, the BMZ should conduct an 
informed dialogue with the other government depart-
ments, acting not only as an investigating body but also 
as an adviser. 
• Mobilizing political support: As coherence is basically a 
question of political interests, it is important for it to be 
discussed in parliament (at national and EU level) and in 
public. Experience shows that skilled analyses, public re-
lations work and political initiatives by parliamentarians, 
NGOs and the media may be important allies of devel-
opment policy in efforts to achieve greater coherence. 
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